

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SAIGON 02942 01 OF 03 151509Z

44

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-09 ISO-00 AID-05 EB-07 PM-03 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 DPW-01 PRS-01 OMB-01

SS-15 SP-02 /092 W

----- 073193

P R 131015Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3694

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USIA WASHDC

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS UNN

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

CIA

DIA

JCS

JUSMAAG

WHITE HOUSE

USAJFKCMA/ATCS-WL-DSA

4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC

CINCPAC

CINCPACAF

CINCPACFLT

DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN

AMCONSUL BIEN HOA

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMCONSUL DANANG

AMCONSUL NHA TRANG

AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SAIGON 02942 01 OF 03 151509Z

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USDAO SAIGON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 2942

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/P FOR INFO

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MILI, MARR, EGEN, PGOV, PINR, VN

SUBJ: SAIGON MISSION NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLY NO 30

SUMMARY: "THE JANUARY ISSUE OF HOC TAP, WHICH JUST BECAME AVAILABLE IN TRANSLATION PROVIDES A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CURRENT COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY EMPHASAZING ALLEGED US AND GVN WEAKNESSES AND BY CALLING FOR INTENSIFIED INITIATIVES ON ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING THE CITIES." A RECENT REPORT PROVIDES EVIDENCE OF PLANNED LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN 1975 AND A NORTH VIETNAMESE "GENERAL MOBILIZATION" TO SUPPORT THEM, AIMED AT FORCING THE GVN TO "RESPECT THE SPIRIT" OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT. THE "PRG" FOREIGN MINISTRY, MEANWHILE, DENIED NORTH VIETNAMESE INVOLVEMENT AT BAN ME THUOT, CLAIMING INSTEAD THAT THE PEOPLE, "TOGETHER WITH THE PLAF," HAD RISEN UP."

SOVIET DEPUTY FORMIN MADE AN UNPUBLICIZED VISIT TO HANOI EARLY IN MARCH AND THEN MOVED ON TO LAOS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION IN NORTH VIETNAM HELD TALKS IN HANOI AND THEN TOURED SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM MILITARY INSTALLATIONS FOR SIX DAYS; RETURNING TO HANOI MARCH 10, THEY CALLED ON PHAM VAN DONG AND TH "PRG" REPRESENTATIVE MARCH 13. NO CLEAR PURPOSE FOR THE VISIT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED.

THE "PRG'S" NGUYEN VAN TIEN REPORTED PUBLICLY ON HIS DECEMBER-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SAIGON 02942 01 OF 03 151509Z

FEBRUARY TOUR OF SIX AFRICAN COUNTRIES, DURING WHICH LIBYA AGREED TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS, SIERRA LEONE PROMOSED TO CONSIDER RELATIONS, AND ZAIRE, HE CLAIMED, "RECOGNIZED BOTH" THE GVN AND "PRG". MADAME BINH SET OUT ON AN AFRO-ASIAN TOUR, VISITING AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT AND LIBYA THUS FAR; AFGHANISTAN ANNOUNCED DE JURE RECOGNITION AS A RESULT

JAPAN ANNOUNCED IT PLANS TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN HANOI APRIL 1, AND THE DRV ANNOUNCED ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH NIGER. DRV POLIT-

BURO MEMBER HOANG VAN HOAN LEFT HANOI FOR HUNGARY. GDR AND NORWEGIAN AID TO THE DRV WAS REPORTED, AS WAS NORWEGIAN AID TO THE "PRG". END SUMMARY.

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

A. DRV PARTY JOURNAL RATIONALIZES CURRENT OFFENSIVE

1. IN THE JANUARY ISSUE OF THE PARTY JOURNAL HOC TAP, WHICH JUST BECAME AVAILABLE TO THE US EMBASSY SAIGON, THE HANOI LEADERSHIP PROVIDES A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CURRENT COMMUNIST MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHILE THERE IS THE USUAL HYPERBOLE ABOUT GVN NIBBLING TACTICS AND COMMUNIST MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUCCESSES SINCE THE PARIS ACCORDS, THE MAIN EMPHASIS OF THE COMMENTARY IS ON THE "BANKRUPTCY" OF US POLICY AND THE US'S APPARENT INABILITY TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. DESCRIBING THE CUTBACK OF US AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM AS A SYMPTOM OF THE "DIFFICULT, MULTIFACETED SITUATION NOW CONFRONTING THE US ADMINISTRATION," THE ARTICLE RULES OUT POSSIBLE US REENTRY INTO THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT AND LEAVES LITTLE DOUBT THAT THIS FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN HANOI'S DECISION TO INTENSIFY THE FIGHTING IN 1975.

2. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO ARGUE THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES HAVE BECOME WEAKENED AND OVEREXTENDED IN THE PAST YEAR AS RESULT OF AID REDUCTIONS AND OTHER PROBLEMS AND THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS LOST POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS FACING MOUNTING POPULAR RESENTMENT. AT ONE POINT, IT STATES THAT THE US IS PLANNING TO REPLACE THIEU WITH SOMEONE ELSE THOUGH "NO MATTER WHETHER THIEU IS TO BE DONE AWAY WITH, THE US IMPERIALISTS WILL BE UNABLE TO SOLVE THE COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND TO AVOID DEFEAT." THIS PASSAGE MAY BE DESIGNED TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED FIGHTING UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SAIGON 02942 01 OF 03 151509Z

3. THE ARTICLE CALLS EXPLICITLY FOR HEIGHTENED COMMUNIST INITIATIVES "ON ALL FRONTS" AND, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE CITIES. ITS EMPHASIS ON THE URBAN STRUGGLE - SO REMINISCENT OF COMMUNIST GUIDANCE DURING THE 1968 OFFENSIVE -- IS ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY IN VIEW OF THE RECENT COMMUNIST ATTACKS ON BAN ME THUOT, TIEN PHUOC DISTRICT TOWN (QUANG TRI PROVINCE) AND DUC LAP DISTRICT TOWN (QUANG DUC PROVINCE). THE COMMUNISTS EVIDENTLY FEEL THAT INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE IN SUCH URBAN AREAS WILL LEAD TO INCREASED POPULAR PRESSURE AGAINST THIEU.

4. LIKE RECENT COVERT COMMUNIST GUIDANCE, THE COMMENTARY PORTRAYS MILITARY ACTION AS A WAY OF BRINGING ABOUT "CONDITIONS" THAT WILL LEAD TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S FALL - ALL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE

PARIS AGREEMENT, WHICH IT CYNICALLY ENDORSES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO ELABORATION OF WHAT THESE CONDITIONS MIGHT BE, THE ARTICLE'S ALLUSIONS TO MOUNTING POPULAR RESENTMENT AGAINST THE GVN AND TO A US CABAL AGAINST THIEU IMPLY THE HOPE -- HOWEVER MISGUIDED -- THAT VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN DISENCHANTMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE GENERATED BY THE CURRENT MILITARY CAMPAIGN. THERE IS ALSO A STRONG HINT IN THE ARTICLE THAT THE OFFENSIVE IS MEANT AS MUCH AS ANY-THING ELSE TO STRENGTHEN THE "PRG" BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE NEGOTIATING ARENA.

5. THE COMMENTARY LENDS CREDENCE TO RECENT INDICATIONS OF AN ONGOING POLICY DISPUTE IN NORTH VIETNAM OVER WHETHER THE REGIME SHOULD EMPHASIZE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT OR THE WAR. WHILE OFFERING A STRONG CASE FOR THE MILITARY OPTION, THE ARTICLE ITSELF ATTEMPTS TO TURN THE ARGUMENT FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON ITS HEAD, SAYING THAT "THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM IN THE NORTH" ACTUALLY "INFLUENCES" THE "GROWTH OF THE SOUTHERN REVOLUTION" (RATHER THAN DETRACTS FROM IT OR CONFLICTS WITH IT). ELSEWHERE THE ARTICLE INSISTS THAT THE CURRENT "REALITIES" "PROVE" THE CORRECTNESS OF THE MILITARY LINE, A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE FORMULATION THAT IMPLIES THAT THERE ARE STILL THOSE IN THE LEADERSHIP THAT NEED PERSUADING.

END UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 SAIGON 02942 01 OF 03 151509Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SAIGON 02942 02 OF 03 151513Z

53
ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-09 ISO-00 AID-05 EB-07 PM-03 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 DPW-01 PRS-01 OMB-01

SS-15 SP-02 /092 W
----- 073232

P R 131015Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3695
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL JEC PARIS UNN
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CIA
DIA
JCS
JUSMAAG
WHITE HOUSE
USAJFKCMA/ATCS-WL-DSA
4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
CINCPACFLT
DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN
AMCONSUL BIEN HOA
AMCONSUL CAN THO
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMCONSUL NHA TRANG
AMEMBASSY LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SAIGON 02942 02 OF 03 151513Z

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USDAO SAIGON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 2942

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/P FOR INFO

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC

B. COMMUNIST GUIDANCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. ACCORDING TO A RECENT RALLIER FROM QUANG NAM PROVINCE, THE CURRENT INTENSIFIED COMMUNIST MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS BASED ON A NEW GUIDANCE DOCUMENT WHICH CALLS FOR LARGE SCALE ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN 1975 AND "A GENERAL MOBILIZATION IN NORTH VIETNAM" TO SUPPORT THEM. BY HIS ACCOUNT, ALL YOUNG MEN OF DRAFT AGE ARE TO BE SENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACKS, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS LIKEWISE ARE TO BE INFILTRATED TO BUTTRESS AGENT NETWORKS AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE MOVEMENTS THERE. AS FOR THE MILITARY OPERATIONS THEMSELVES, THEY REPORTEDLY ARE TO BE FULLY COORDINATED AND ARE TO BE AIMED AT FORCING THE GVN TO "RESPECT THE SPIRIT OF THE PARIS ACCORDS" AND TO ACCEPT HANOI'S CONDITIONS FOR ENDING THE WAR. THE SOURCE DESCRIBED 1975 AS A YEAR IN WHICH "MANY CHANGES IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE TO TAKE PLACE."

2. ALTHOUGH THE GUIDANCE REFLECTED IN THE RALLIER'S REPORT MAY CONTAIN SOME EXAGGERATED CLAIMS TO BOLSTER CADRE AND TROOP MORALE, THE EMPHASIS ON HEIGHTENED MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF 1975 IS REMINISCENT OF OTHER COMMUNIST POLICY DOCUMENTATION WHICH HAS FALLEN INTO GOVERNMENT HANDS. THE MILITANT TONE OF THE GUIDANCE ALSO IS FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE THRUST OF THE COMMENTARY IN THE JANUARY "HOC TAP" WHICH CALLS FOR INTENSIFIED COMMUNIST INITIATIVES "ON ALL FRONTS," INCLUDING THE CITIES. (SEE ITEM A ABOVE)
END CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SAIGON 02942 02 OF 03 151513Z

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

C. COMMUNISTS CLAIM "UPRISING" IN BAN ME THUOT

1. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED MARCH 11, 1975, THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE SO-CALLED "PRG" REJECTED US-RVN CHARGES OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN THE RECENT FIGHTING IN DARLAC PROVINCE AS "FALSE ALLEGATIONS" AND CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLE OF BAN ME THUOT, "TOGETHER WITH THE PLAF," HAD "RISEN UP." SIMILARLY SPECIOUS CLAIMS OF "POPULAR UPRISING" WERE MADE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF PHUOC LONG PROVINCE. THE "PRG" FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ATTEMPTED TO CHARACTERIZE RECENT COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY AS A RESPONSE, WITH "APPROPRIATE FORMS AND APPROPRIATE FORCES," TO ALLEGED RVN PROVOCATIONS. THE STATEMENT ALSO REITERATED THE COMMUNISTS' OCTOBER 8, 1974, DEMAND FOR AN END TO US INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE OVERTHROW OF THIEU AS THE "CORRECT WAY" TO SOLVE THE SOUTH VIETNAM ISSUE.

2. LIBERATION RADIO ON MARCH 12 ADMITTED COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF HAU DUC AND TIEN PHUOC DISTRICT TOWNS IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, CLAIMING THAT BOTH WERE AREAS FROM WHICH ARVN HAD CONDUCTED "TERRORIZING, REPRESSING AND PLUNDERING OPERATIONS," PERHAPS AS A RESULT OF THE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SUFFERED, HOWEVER, LIBERATION RADIO REJECTED

AS "DESPICALBE SLANDER" CHARGES THAT COMMUNIST FORCES HAD SHELLED
DANANG AIRBASE MARCH 11.

END UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

D. SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS HANOI

NIKOLAY FIRYUBIN, SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER,
QUIETLY VISITED HANOI EARLY IN MARCH AND THEN TRAVELLED TO
LAOS MARCH 5 FOR A HASTILY-ARRANGED FOUR-DAY OFFICIAL VISIT
APPARENTLY DESIGNED TO PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR HIS TRIP TO INDO-
CHINA. THE NORTH VIETNAM VISIT WAS NOT OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED BY
EITHER HANOI OR MOSCOW. FRENCH SOURCES IN HANOI (AFP) AND MOSCOW
(MOSCOW 3040) SPECULATED THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CAMBODIAN
SITUATION MAY HAVE FORMED THE BASIS FOR FIRYUBIN'S DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE DRV.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SAIGON 02942 02 OF 03 151513Z

END CONFIDENTIAL

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

3. CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION TALKS AND TOURS PANHANDLE

1. THE CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION WHICH ARRIVED IN HANOI
FEBRUARY 28 (SEE NORTH VIETNAM BIWEEKLY NO 29. MET WITH A VPA
TEAM HEADED BY DEPUTY DEFMIN GEN HAONG VAN THAI EARLY LAST WEEK
AND THEN ACCORDING TO BOTH VNA AND NCNA, TOURED SOUTHERN NORTH
VIETNAM MARCH 5-10. IN ADDITION TO VISITING HO CHI MINH'S BIRTH-
PLACE THEY REPORTEDLY TOURED VPA, AIR DEFENSE, AIR FORCE, AND
NAVY INSTALLATIONS IN NGHE AN PROVINCE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE.
BACK IN HANOI, THE DELEGATION VISITED FACTORIES, MUSEUMS AND
AIR DEFENSE UNITS. ON MARCH 13 THEY CALLED ON PREMIER PHAN
VAN DONG AND "PRG" SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE NGUYEN VAN TIEN.

2. PUBLISHED REPORTS HAVE STUDIOUSLY EMPHASIZED THE BILATERAL
NATURE OF THE VISIT AND AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF NEW COMMITMENTS ON
EITHER SIDE, ALTHOUGH THE COMPOSITION OF BOTH TEAMS WOULD INDICATE
THAT CHINESE MILITARY AID HAS BEEN A CENTRAL TOPIC OF DISCUSSION.
THE CHINESE DELEGATION CHIEF, IN THE CLOSEST APPROACH TO A PROMISE,
SAID ON MARCH 10 THAT "NOW AS BEFORE" THE CHINESE WOULD "FULFILL OUR
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TOWARD AND RESOLUTELY SUPPORT THE VIETNA-
MESE POEPL'S JUST STRUGGLE UNTIL COMPLETE VICTORY."

3. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LONG VISIT AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE REMAINS
UNCLEAR. PARTICULARLY PUZZLING IS THE SIX-DAY RURAL TOUR, WHICH
COULD INDICATE AN INSPECTION OF CHINESE AID UTILIZATION OR SIMPLY

A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE CHINESE INTEREST IN NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS. THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION, WHICH MAY WELL HAVE PROVIDED AT LEAST SOME OF THE IMPETUS FOR THE CHINESE VISIT, HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED IN REPORTS OF THE ACTIVITIES.

F. NGUYEN VAN TIEN MAKES AFRICAN TOUR

1. NGUYEN VAN TIEN, MEMBER OF THE NLF CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HEAD OF THE "PRG" SPECIAL REPRESENTATION IN HANOI, RECENTLY ISSUED A STATEMENT (CARRIED MARCH 2 BY LIBERATION RADIO) ON HIS LATE DECEMBER 1974 - EARLY FEBRUARY 1975 VISIT TO SIX AFRICAN COUNTRIES:
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 SAIGON 02942 02 OF 03 151513Z

LIBYA, DECEMBER 25 -JANUARY 2; MAURITANIA, JANUARY 7-9; SENEGAL, JANUARY 10-13; GUINEA, JANUARY 23-28; SIERRA LEONE, JANUARY 30-FEBRUARY 1; AND ZAIRE, FEBRUARY 4-8. TIEN'S WHEREABOUTS FROM JANUARY 14-22 REMAIN UNKNOWN. THREE OF THE COUNTRIES VISITED BY TIEN (MAURITANIA, GUINEA AND SENEGAL) HAD DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE "PRG" BEFORE TIEN'S ARRIVAL. THE FACT THAT THE OTHER THREE HAD NOT RECOGNIZED THE "PRG" MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT TIEN TRAVELED AS THE "SPECIAL ENVOY" OF NLF CHAIRMAN NGUYEN HUU THO AND NOT AS AN OFFICIAL OF THE "PRG".

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SAIGON 02942 03 OF 03 151905Z

44

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-09 ISO-00 SP-02 AID-05 EB-07 PM-03

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 DPW-01 PRS-01

OMB-01 SS-15 /092 W

----- 074682

P R 131015Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3696

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USDEL JEC PARIS UNN
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
USLO PEKING
CIA
DIA
JCS
JUSMAAG
WHITE HOUSE
USAJFKCMA/ATCS-WL-DSA
4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
CINCPACFLT
DEPCHIEF JUSMAAG UDORN
AMCONSUL BIEN HOA
AMCONSUL CAN THO
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMCONSUL NHA TRANG
AMEMBASSY LONDON
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SAIGON 02942 03 OF 03 151905Z

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USDAO SAIGON
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 2942

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS TO S/P FOR INFO

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC

2. TIEN DELIVERED LETTERS FROM NGUYEN HUU THO TO LEADERS OF THE
COUNTRIEDLY LINKED TO "PRG" EFFORTS TO BE
SEATED AT THE FEBURARY LOW CONFERENCE, TIEN'S VISIT OBVIOUSLY HAD
A LONGER RANGE PURPOSE AS WELL. HIS STAY IN LIBYA RESULTED, HE
SAID, IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THAT
COUNTRY AND THE "PRG" (JANUARY 1, 1975). TIEN ALSO CLAIMED TO HAVE
BEEN TOLD BY PRESIDENT SIAKA STEVENS THAT SIERRA LEONE "WKLL SOON

MAKE A DECISION" ON RECONGITION OF THE "PRG". TIEN CHARACTERIZED HIS VISIT TO ZIARE AS "FURTHER ISOLATING AND WEAKENING" THE RVN' INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND MADE THE SO-FAR UNCONFIRMED ASSERTION THAT ZAIRE "RECOGNIZES BOTH ADMINISTRATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM."

G. MME BINH BEGINS AFRO-ASIAN TOUR; AFGHANS RECOGNIZE "PRG"

1. "PRG" FORMIN MME NGUYEN THI BINH LEFT HANOI FEBRUARY 28 ON A TOUR OF AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES. HER ITINERARY SO FAR HAS INCLUDED PEKING (FEBURARY 28-MARCE 3), MOSCOW (MARCH 3-5), KABUL (MARCH 5-7), CAIRO (MARCH 7-12), AND TRIPOLI. SHE REPORTEDLY WILL STAY IN TRIPOLI FOR SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE MOVING ON.

2. FOLLOWING HER VISIT IN AFTHANISTAN THE GOA ANNOUNCED THAT IT HAD EXTENDED DE JURE RECOGNITION TO THE "PRG"; THE LATTER RECOGNIZED THE GOA ON JULY 31, 1973.

H. JAPAN TO OPEN EMBASSY IN HANOI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SAIGON 02942 03 OF 03 151905Z

1. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED MARCH 6 THAT A SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH THE DRV (SEE NORTH VIETNAM BIWEEKLY NO 27) AND AN EMBASSY WOULD BE OPENED IN HANOI APRIL 1. JAPAN AGREED TO PROVIDE 5 BILLION YEN IN GRANT AID TO NORTH VIETNAM AND PROMISED A JOINT STUDY ON MORE AID LATER. THE DRV, FOR ITS PART, DROPPED ITS INSISTENCE ON RECOGNITION OF THE "PRG" AS A PRECONDITION, AS IT HAS DONE IN OTHER RECENT CASES.

2. LATER FOREIGN PRESS REPORTS FROM HANOI, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT HANOI MAY HAVE TRIED TO REOPEN THE TWO ISSUES WHEN JAPANESE DIPLOMATS ARRIVED MARCH 9 TO PREPARE FOR THE EMBASSY OPENING. AFP ON MARCH 10 QUOTED AN "AUTHORITATIVE VIETNAMESE SOURCE" AS SAYING "CERTAIN PENDIN G ISSUES", INCLUDING AID AND THE "PRG", WERE UNDER DISCUSSION BUT THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE "MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS". KYODO REPORTED FROM HANOI MARCH 11 THAT "IF THINGS GO SMOOTHLY, THE JAPANESE EMBASSY WILL OPEN HERE SOMETIME LATE THIS SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER."

I. DRV AND NIGER ESTABLISH RELATIONS

A MARCH 12 DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED THAT NORTH VIETNAM AND THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER HAD AGREED TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. NIGER HAS HAD SIMILAR RELATIONS WITH THE GVN SINCE 1961.

J. DRV POLITBURO MEMBER EN ROUTE TO HUNGARY

A VWP DELEGATION HEADED BY POLITBURO MEMBER HOANG VAN HOAN
LEFT HANOI MARCH 10 TO ATTEND THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
CONGRESS. IN PEKING THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOANG'S PARTY HAD DINNER
WITH CCP POLITBURO MEMBER CHI TENG-KUEI.

K. AID TO DRV AND "PRG"

THE GDR REPORTEDLY PROMISED TO PROVIDE 5 MILLION MARKS IN
"SOLIDARITY GOODS" FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN THE DRV. A
NORWEGIAN AID DELEGATION IN HANOI AGREED TO PROVIDE THE DRV WITH A
MARINE RESOURCES EXPLORATION VESSEL AND TO PROVIDE THE "PRG" WITH
20 MILLION KRONERS IN GRANT AID FOR 1975 IN THE FORM OF AGRICULTURAL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 SAIGON 02942 03 OF 03 151905Z

MACHINES, CONSUMER GOODS, MEDICINES AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT.
END UNCLASSIFIED
LEHMANN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLY, POLITICAL SUMMARIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: buchantr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SAIGON02942
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750091-0761
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750354/aaaabwgs.tel
Line Count: 568
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: buchantr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13 MAY 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <07 OCT 2003 by buchantr>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SAIGON MISSION NORTH VIETNAM BI-WEEKLY NO 30 SUMMARY: "THE JANUARY ISSUE OF HOC TAP, WHICH JUST BECAME
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, MARR, EGEN, PGOV, PINR, VN
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006